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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of inflation targeting (IT) regimes for public debt
accumulation. By utilizing a simple dynamic macroeconomic policymaking model, we show
that IT regimes may lead to higher public debt. Our results suggest that in countries where
there are inherent distortions in the economy all IT regimes can do is shift the burden of
adjustment onto other aspects of macroeconomic policymaking. We therefore argue that,
adopting an IT regime without carrying out the required reforms towards eliminating the
distortions in the economy is not necessarily an effective device for overall macroeconomic
stability.
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During the 1990s, in￿ ation targeting (IT) emerged as the preferred form of monetary
policy framework in a large number of countries. This was partly due to the failure of
targeting monetary aggregates in previous decades and partly to the breakdown of pegged
exchange rate regimes throughout the 1990s. The success of initial targeters such as Chile,
New Zealand, the UK, Israel and Canada in reducing in￿ ation has made IT an attractive
monetary policy option for a wide variety of countries.
Researchers attempting to examine whether IT can be applied more widely, especially in
emerging market countries, have highlighted the soundness of ￿scal stance and the absence
of ￿scal dominance as pre-conditions for a successful IT regime (see, for example, Amato
and Gerlach, 2002, Giavazzi, 2003 and Fraga et al., 2003).1 Indeed, the evolution of ￿scal
stance is not independent of the monetary policy regime. Clearly, the adoption of an IT
regime imposes obvious constraints on governments￿￿scal balances by restricting seigniorage
revenues and preventing central bank￿ s credit. Fiscal implications of an IT regime may
be particularly important for emerging market countries with low tax bases and high debt
levels.2 Some researchers have recently pointed to the cases of Brazil and Turkey to highlight
the risks of pursuing IT regimes in a high-debt environment and showed how the IT regime
may raise the debt even further (for the case of Brazil, see, for example, Blanchard, 2004 and
Favero and Giavazzi, 2004; for Turkey￿ s case see Ersel and Ozatay, 2008 and Sahinbeyoglu,
2008). Indeed, a number of other emerging market countries such as Colombia, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland and Thailand experienced sharp rises in debt levels
following the adoption of the IT regime.
The increase in emerging markets￿public debt-to-GDP ratios has been attracting consid-
erable attention since the early 2000s (see, for instance, the IMF World Economic Outlook
2003 and the Bank of England Stability Review 2003). It has been argued that this increase
in debt accumulation resulted from a greater reliance of public ￿nances on domestic debt, a
tendency that started in the mid-1990s. Such reliance on domestic debt, in turn, has been
linked to the improved cost of domestic borrowing resulting from a benevolent macroeco-
nomic environment, among other factors (Hanson, 2007). Recent evidence suggests that
emerging economies have shifted their debt composition towards domestic borrowing, pro-
ducing a domestic versus foreign debt mix similar to that of advanced countries (Jeanne
and Guscina, 2006).3
This paper provides one potential explanation for such rises in public debt levels by
formally examining the role of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank
and implementing an IT regime on public debt accumulation. Although the implications of
existing ￿scal environment for a successful implementation of IT regimes have been widely
discussed, ￿scal consequences of IT regimes have received very little attention in formal
1Formal evidence on the implications of the IT regimes is mixed. For example, Ball and Sheridan (2005)
argue that there is not su¢ cient evidence on the role of IT regimes in reducing in￿ ation and in￿ ation
volatility. On the other hand, Goncalves and Salles (2008) show that IT regimes have not only reduced
in￿ ation in emerging market countries, they also brought down growth volatility.
2See, for example, IMF(2003).
3This is in contrast to the so called ￿ original sin￿argument, which refers to the inability of a country to
borrow abroad in its own currency (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2004).
1studies. This is the main motivation for the analysis in this paper. By utilizing a simple
dynamic macroeconomic policymaking model, we show that IT regimes may indeed lead to
higher public debt. We also derive the condition under which this is more likely.
2. The model
In order to investigate the ￿scal implications of IT regimes, we utilize a simple two-period
model of discretionary monetary and ￿scal policy.4 The government￿ s disutility function can
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t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the government, ￿1 and ￿2 represent, re-
spectively, the government￿ s relative dislikes for the deviations of in￿ ation (￿t) and public
spending as a share of output (gt) from their target levels (e ￿t and e gt respectively) relative
to the deviations of (log of) output (xt) from its target level (e xt) and ￿G is the govern-
ment￿ s discount factor. A non-zero output target (e xt) represents the bliss point for output
in the absence of non-tax distortions, for example, due to labour or commodity market
imperfections. The bliss point for public spending (e gt) can be interpreted as the optimal
share of non-distortionary output to be spent on public spending. Both weights ￿1 and ￿2
and the bliss points for output and public spending; e xt and e gt re￿ ect the political and the
institutional structure of the economy.
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t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the CB at period t; ￿CB is the CB￿ s
discount factor and ￿1 is used for the CB￿ s in￿ ation aversion parameter. In contrast to the
government acting through the ￿scal authority (FA), the independent CB cares only about
deviations of in￿ ation and output from their targets. Under the IT regime, the government
assigns an speci￿c target for in￿ ation, ￿T
t , to the CB. In that case, this target replaces e ￿t
in equation (2).
Output is given by the following production function: Yt = N
￿
t , where Yt and Nt repre-
sent output and labour respectively, in period t and 0 < ￿ < 1. Distortionary taxes, which
are the only form of taxes available to the government, are levied on output at the rate ￿t.
A representative competitive ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize pro￿ts Pt(1 ￿ ￿t)N
￿
t ￿ WtNt,
where Pt and Wt represent the price level and the wage rate respectively, in period t. A
representative competitive ￿rm chooses labor to maximize pro￿ts by taking Pt, Wt and ￿t
as given. The resulting output supply function is yt = v(pt ￿wt ￿￿t)+z; where lower case
letters represent logs, e.g. yt = ln(Yt); v = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿); z = v ln(￿) and ln(1 ￿ ￿) ’ ￿￿.
4Similar variants of this model are used by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997, 1999) and Ozkan (2000).
2Normalizing output by subtracting z from yt; for simplicity and utilizing wt = pe
t yields the
following normalized output supply function
xt = v(￿t ￿ ￿
e
t ￿ ￿t) (3)
where ￿e
t is expected in￿ ation and all other variables are as de￿ned above.
The government budget constraint creates the link between the ￿scal and monetary
policies chosen by the government and the CB. This constraint is formally given by:
gt + (1 + ￿ + (￿
e
t ￿ ￿t))dt￿1 = ￿t + k￿t + dt (4)
where dt￿1 is the debt issued in period t ￿ 1 (as a ratio of output) that should be paid
back at period t, ￿ is the ex ante real interest rate, dt is the debt issued in period t and k
measures real money holdings as a share of output.5 Clearly, surprise in￿ ation erodes the
real value of government￿ s obligations. Equation (4) also suggests that a favorable change
in in￿ ation expectations relaxes the government￿ s ￿nancing requirement.6
3. Debt dynamics
In choosing the level of borrowing in t = 1, the policymaker weighs the bene￿ts and
costs of borrowing vis-￿-vis those of the other forms of ￿nancing. Resorting to borrowing
in the ￿rst period alleviates the in-period distortionary e⁄ects of the ￿nancing requirement
by reducing the pressure on taxes and seigniorage in t = 1, but only to increase them when
it is time to re-pay the debt in t = 2. Clearly, the greater the use of borrowing in t = 1, the
greater the required use of in￿ ation and taxes in t = 2. Given that t = 2 is the ￿nal period,
no new debt is issued in the second period. Thus, all borrowing is regarded as short-term
and matures after one period, which means that all the outstanding liabilities are paid in
t = 2.7
We solve for the equilibrium outcome using backwards induction. Formally, solving the
policymaker￿ s loss minimization problem in t = 2; calculating the welfare losses in t = 2 and
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e
1 ￿ ￿1))d0 ￿ d1] + ￿GL
G
2 (5)
5While seigniorage revenues, k￿t tend to be negligible in industrial economies, emerging market countries
with less developed ￿nancial systems routinely resort to seigniorage as a source of revenue (see, for example,
IMF World Economic Outlook, 2001).
6This favourable role of reduced in￿ ationary expectations on relaxing the government budget constraint
could be a signi￿cant bene￿t associated with successful IT regimes. This is especially the case for emerging
market countries that pay high premia on their debts.
7There is a possibility that IT regimes, if successful and credible, may increase the average duration of
public debt. Given the two-period nature of our framework, incorporating this possibility is beyond the
scope this analysis.
3where LG
2 is the value of the government￿ s welfare losses in t = 2 and ￿2 is the Lagrange
multiplier. Solving the minimization problem stated in (10) yields the equilibrium values
of the choice variables; ￿1; ￿1; g1 and d1. Details of this derivation are presented in the
Appendix:
Table 1 presents the outcome for public borrowing in t = 1 under three di⁄erent policy-
making arrangements and provides the basis of our comparative analysis. The ￿rst of these
cases is centralized discretion where the government controls both the ￿scal and monetary
policymaking, which is used as a benchmark. We also consider delegation to a conserva-
tive central bank (CCB) with and without an explicit in￿ ation target. Following Svensson
(1997), under an IT regime the CB is assigned an explicit in￿ ation target designed to attain
the government￿ s in￿ ation bliss point.8
Table 1- Equilibrium borrowing under centralized discretion, CCB and IT
Policymaking Arrangement Debt in t = 1
Centralized discretion dD
1 = [( e K1￿ke ￿1)+(1+￿)d0￿( e K2￿ke ￿2)]+(1￿￿￿
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￿2 and all other parameters are as de￿ned earlier.
The levels of borrowing under the three arrangements can be formally ranked as follows.
Proposition 1 Provided that the CB is more conservative than the government; ￿1 < ￿1,
the ranking of debt under the three arrangements is as follows;







































1 it follows that dCCB
1 > dD
1 : Finally, the ranking between dIT
1 and
8IT regimes may vary in practice according to the degree of committment to the in￿ ation target. In a
recent paper, Carare and Stone (2006) show that the degree of committment to an IT regime is determined
by the existing level of credibility, which in turn, is shaped by the underlying economic structure.
4dCCB











which holds when C￿
C > 1: This condition, in turn, is satis￿ed when k < ￿1=￿1: And vice
versa holds when k > ￿1=￿1:
Outcomes presented in Table 1 suggest that there are two components in determining
the equilibrium debt levels. The ￿rst, [( e K1 ￿ ke ￿1) + (1 + ￿)d0 ￿ ( e K2 ￿ ke ￿2)]; is the gap
between the current and the future ￿nancing requirements nets of targeted seigniorage
revenue. Clearly, the greater the current net requirement relative to the future one, the
higher is the required borrowing. The second component, (1 ￿ ￿
￿
i)( e K2 ￿ ke ￿2) measures
the importance of the second period￿ s net ￿nancing requirement taking into account the
policymaker￿ s discount factor (i = D;C and G). Common to both components are the net
distortions in the economy, as represented by e Kt ￿ ke ￿t = e xt=v + e gt ￿ ke ￿t, that are the
main source of borrowing in all three regimes: Table 1 also reveals that debt varies among
the three regimes due to di⁄erent e⁄ective discount factors in each case. Under discretion,
the e⁄ective discount factor is given by ￿
￿




credibility e⁄ect originates from the government￿ s attempt to reduce public debt in order
to mitigate in￿ ation in t = 2. By doing so, the government exchanges additional output
distortions, resulting from higher taxes in t = 1; for credibility gains in t = 2.
Under CCB; the e⁄ective discount factor features a strategic e⁄ect, C￿
C arising from the
disagreement between the CB and the FA with respect to the optimal level of in￿ ation in
t = 2. It is straightforward to show that, the strategic e⁄ect is smaller than the credibility




1 ; thus delegating monetary policy to a CCB invariably produces a
higher level of debt than under centralized discretion. This is because delegating monetary
policy to a CCB alleviates the credibility problems faced by policymakers associated with
lack of commitment, thus reducing the need to cut down borrowing as an attempt towards
better in￿ ation performance.
Note that the e⁄ective discount factor under the IT regime is ￿
￿
G in which neither the
credibility e⁄ect nor the strategic e⁄ect features. Put di⁄erently, the IT regime which works
as a commitment device eliminates both the strategic and the credibility e⁄ects. Given that
D￿D0
D2
1 > 1, the IT regime unambiguously raises the equilibrium level of debt relative to that
under discretion.
Hence, a regime of centralized discretion always provides less debt accumulation than
delegating monetary policy to a CCB or adopting an IT regime. This result provides
one potential explanation for the increase in debt accumulation experienced by emerging
market countries during the last decade. It is commonly observed that both independent
CBs and explicit and implicit IT regimes have characterized monetary policy design in
many emerging market countries since the early 1990s (see, for example, Cukierman, 2007).
Our analysis suggests that this process might have contributed to the observed higher debt
levels in these countries.
In terms of the debt ranking between the CCB and the IT regimes, Proposition 1
suggests that when k is relatively large as compared with ￿1=￿1, dCCB
1 > dIT
1 . That is, when
k is large the FA raises borrowing in t = 1 under the CCB regime given that the required
in￿ ation to pay for additional debt is small when k is high. In contrast, when k is low the
opposite holds, dIT
1 > dCCB
1 . Given that the IT regime eliminates the strategic e⁄ect the
outcome would be an increase in the equilibrium debt level as compared with that under
5a CCB regime. In other words, since the IT regime assures lower in￿ ation, attempting to
reduce public debt in order to mitigate in￿ ation in t = 2 is no longer an optimal strategy
for the FA. In practice, it is unlikely that k would be higher than ￿1=￿1: Modern economies
with e¢ cient payment systems maintain low money holdings-to-GDP ratios (i.e. k is close
to zero). As a result, public debt under an IT regime would be expected to be higher than
that with a CCB.
4. Concluding remarks
Our formal analysis shows that increased debt accumulation may indeed follow the
delegation of monetary policy to an independent CCB and the adoption of an IT regime.
Our analysis also reveals that the main source of borrowing is the distortions in the economy
that may arise from labour markets, tax systems and political preferences. It, therefore,
follows that in countries where there are inherent distortions in the economy all IT regimes
can do is shift the burden of revenue raising from in￿ ation to other sources of ￿nance such
as borrowing. This, in turn, implies that adopting an IT regime without carrying out the
required reforms towards eliminating the distortions in the economy is not necessarily an
e⁄ective device for overall macroeconomic stability.
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8Appendix
The model in its dynamic set up is solved using backwards induction. To simplify the
analytical solutions presented later on, following Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) we de￿ne
the Government Financing Requirement (GFR) by re-expressing (4) as:
GFRt = e Kt + (1 + ￿ + (￿
e
t ￿ ￿t))dt￿1 ￿ dt = [￿t + e xt=v] + k￿t + [e gt ￿ gt] (A1)
where e Kt = e gt + e xt=v: The GFR is given by the sum of government spending target,
the labour subsidy that aims at compensating the implicit tax on output, e xt=v; and the
outstanding debt obligations net of new borrowing, (1+￿+(￿e
t ￿￿t))dt￿1￿dt: On the right
are the sources of ￿nance for these expenditures; net tax revenues, [￿t + e xt=v]; seigniorage,
k￿t; and the shortfall of public spending relative to its target.
Solution in t = 2
Under the IT regime, the government (￿scal authority) and the independent central
bank play a Nash game in both periods acting simultaneously to choose their respective
instruments.











2 + (x2 ￿ e x2)
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Similarly, the ￿scal authority attempts to minimize its welfare losses subject to the budget
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where ￿2 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the government budget constraint in
period t = 2.
Substituting the output supply function from (3) into (A2) and (A3), then di⁄erentiating




= ￿1(￿2 ￿ ￿
T
2) + v(v(￿2 ￿ ￿
e
2 ￿ ￿2) ￿ e x) = 0
@L2
@￿2
= ￿v(v(￿2 ￿ ￿
e
2 ￿ ￿2) ￿ e x2) ￿ ￿2 = 0
@L2
@g2
= ￿2(g2 ￿ e g2) + ￿2 = 0
































where e C = 1
v2 + 1
￿2:
The in￿ ation target ensuring that equilibrium in￿ ation matches the government target,









[ e K2 + (1 + ￿)d1] (A6)
Substituting this target into the FOCs produces the following equilibrium outcomes under
the IT regime for period t = 2:
￿2 = e ￿2 (A7)
e x2 ￿ x2 =
1=v
e C
[ e K2 + (1 + ￿)d1 ￿ ke ￿2] (A8)
e g2 ￿ g2 =
1=￿2
e C
[ e K2 + (1 + ￿)d1 ￿ ke ￿2] (A9)
Substituting (A7)￿ (A9) into (1) and rearranging yields the welfare losses of the ￿scal
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Solution in t = 1
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(A10)
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(A11)
Di⁄erentiating (A10) and (A11) w.r.to the policymaker￿ s choice variables in t = 1 (i.e. ￿1;
￿1; g1 and d1), then combining the resulting FOCs and the rational expectations condition
10(￿1 = ￿e
















































The in￿ ation target ensuring that equilibrium in￿ ation matches the government target,









[ e K1 + (1 + ￿)d0 ￿ d1] (A15)
Substituting this target into the set of FOCs under rational expectations ((A12)￿ (A14))
leads to the following equilibrium outcomes for t = 1:
￿1 = e ￿1 (A16)
e x1 ￿ x1 =
1=v
e C
[ e K1 + (1 + ￿)d0 ￿ d1 ￿ ke ￿1] (A17)
e g1 ￿ g1 =
1=￿2
e C
[ e K1 + (1 + ￿)d0 ￿ d1 ￿ ke ￿1] (A18)
h
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i
(A19)
By solving (A19) for d1 and re-arranging, we obtain the following expression
d1 =
h￿
e K1 ￿ ke ￿1
￿
+ (1 + ￿)d0 ￿
￿
e K2 ￿ ke ￿2
￿i









This is the equilibrium debt level under IT presented in Table 1.
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